---
title: "Axios Compromised on npm: 1.14.1, 0.30.4 Drop a Cross-Platform RAT"
slug: "axios-compromised-npm-cross-platform-rat"
description: "Axios compromised on npm on March 31, 2026: versions 1.14.1 and 0.30.4 dropped a cross-platform RAT. Verified timeline, impact, IOCs, and recovery."
publishDate: "2026-03-31"
updatedDate: "2026-03-31"
author: Umesh Malik
canonical: "https://umesh-malik.com/blog/axios-compromised-npm-cross-platform-rat"
geoRegion: "US"
geoPlacename: "United States"
category: "AI Security"
tags:
- Axios
- npm
- Security
- Supply Chain Security
- DevSecOps
- JavaScript
- Node.js
- Open Source Security
- Malware
keywords: "Axios compromised npm, axios 1.14.1 compromised, axios 0.30.4 compromised, plain-crypto-js 4.2.1, axios remote access trojan, npm supply chain attack March 2026, axios npm malware, how to check axios compromise, npm trusted publishing, postinstall malware"
primaryKeyword: "Axios compromised on npm"
secondaryKeywords:
- axios 1.14.1 compromised
- axios 0.30.4 compromised
- plain-crypto-js 4.2.1
- axios remote access trojan
- npm supply chain attack March 2026
- postinstall malware
- npm trusted publishing
geoHooks:
- TL;DR
- Attack timeline
- How to check
- Recovery steps
- FAQ
image: "/blog/axios-compromised-npm-cover.svg"
imageAlt: "Editorial cover: the Axios npm supply-chain compromise (1.14.1 and 0.30.4)"
featured: true
published: true
readingTime: "4 min read"
---

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Axios is one of the most trusted packages in the JavaScript ecosystem. **Axios compromised on npm** is exactly what happened on **March 31, 2026**: two poisoned releases quietly shipped a cross-platform remote access trojan to anyone who installed them, and that trust path broke. It is the same supply-chain attack surface I unpack in [how a poisoned developer tool becomes an AI-agent attack vector](/blog/ai-agent-attacks-developer-matplotlib-open-source), and exactly what an [enterprise AI security model](/blog/agentic-ai-enterprise-security-model) is built to contain. See also [The $100M AI Heist](/blog/anthropic-detecting-preventing-distillation-attacks) and, from the same day, the [Claude Code source-map leak](/blog/claude-code-leak-march-2026).

[StepSecurity](https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/axios-compromised-on-npm-malicious-versions-drop-remote-access-trojan) disclosed that malicious npm releases `axios@1.14.1` and `axios@0.30.4` pulled a hidden dependency, `plain-crypto-js@4.2.1`, whose `postinstall` script fetched a cross-platform remote access trojan. [An axios GitHub issue documenting the compromise](https://github.com/axios/axios/issues/10604) was opened the same day.

The short answer: **if a developer laptop or CI runner installed either version during the exposure window, treat it as a potential host compromise, not just a bad library update.**

What makes this incident unusually serious is that the attacker did not need obvious malicious changes across the Axios codebase. According to StepSecurity's diff analysis, the attack path was built around **publish credentials, dependency injection, install-time execution, and anti-forensics cleanup**.

## What is the Axios npm compromise?

**Axios compromised on npm** is the March 31, 2026 supply-chain incident in which two poisoned releases, `1.14.1` and `0.30.4`, silently pulled in a hidden dependency whose install-time hook dropped a cross-platform remote access trojan onto every machine that installed them.

<StatHighlight
  title="AXIOS COMPROMISE AT A GLANCE"
  stats={[
    { value: '100M+', label: 'Weekly Downloads', sublabel: 'Axios reach cited by StepSecurity' },
    { value: '2', label: 'Poisoned releases', sublabel: '1.14.1 and 0.30.4' },
    { value: '< 3 hrs', label: 'Exposure window', sublabel: 'before npm pulled axios versions' },
    { value: '3', label: 'Target OSes', sublabel: 'macOS, Windows, Linux' }
  ]}
/>

<ReaderPaths
  title="READ THE SECTION THAT MATCHES YOUR JOB"
  intro="This incident means different things depending on whether you own applications, incident response, or package publishing."
  columns={3}
  paths={[
    {
      eyebrow: 'NODE TEAMS',
      title: 'You need the affected versions and triage checks',
      description: 'Start with TL;DR, then jump to the detection section and first-hour checklist.',
      focus: ['Affected versions', 'How to check lockfiles and hosts', 'Immediate containment'],
      outcome: 'You will know whether your project needs a normal dependency fix or full incident response.',
      tone: 'success'
    },
    {
      eyebrow: 'SECURITY TEAMS',
      title: 'You need the kill chain and IOCs',
      description: 'Focus on the timeline, how the dropper worked, and the platform-specific artifacts.',
      focus: ['Timeline', 'C2 and file indicators', 'Rebuild and secret rotation logic'],
      outcome: 'You will have a cleaner technical narrative for triage, forensics, and stakeholder updates.',
      tone: 'warning'
    },
    {
      eyebrow: 'PACKAGE MAINTAINERS',
      title: 'You need the release-pipeline lesson',
      description: 'Read the provenance section and maintainer guidance after the incident summary.',
      focus: ['Trusted publishing', '2FA and token policy', 'Release metadata drift'],
      outcome: 'You will see why package security now depends as much on publish-path hardening as code review.',
      tone: 'info'
    }
  ]}
/>

## TL;DR

- **The malicious Axios versions were `1.14.1` and `0.30.4`, published on March 31, 2026.**

- According to StepSecurity, both releases injected **`plain-crypto-js@4.2.1`**, a dependency not used anywhere in Axios source code.

- The malicious package ran a **`postinstall`** hook that contacted the attacker's infrastructure and pulled platform-specific payloads for **macOS, Windows, and Linux**.

- StepSecurity says the malware then **rewrote its own `package.json`** to look clean, which means naive post-incident inspection can miss what happened.

- StepSecurity's March 31 timeline says npm later **unpublished the bad Axios versions** and reverted `latest` to `1.14.0`.

- **If `plain-crypto-js` exists in `node_modules` at all, that is already suspicious,** because legitimate Axios releases do not depend on it.

- **If a developer machine or runner installed the bad versions and had secrets available, rotate credentials and rebuild from known-good state.**

- The larger lesson is about **release provenance**: npm's own docs recommend **trusted publishing with OIDC** because it removes the reusable token risk that attacks like this exploit.

![StepSecurity diagram showing the decoded Axios malware flow from install-time execution to cross-platform payload delivery](https://cdn.prod.website-files.com/673b71f0790aabf30bd30bf8/69cba62d7e1664416a0e1dfb_mermaid-diagram-2026-03-31-034649.png)

*Source: StepSecurity technical analysis published on March 30-31, 2026.*

## Axios compromised on npm: what happened and when

The verified story starts on **March 30, 2026** and unfolds quickly.

StepSecurity says the attacker first seeded a lookalike dependency, then published the poisoned Axios versions just after midnight UTC on March 31. The packages were removed within hours, but the short exposure window does not make the incident low risk. An install-time payload only needs one successful run.

<Timeline
  steps={[
    {
      date: '2026-03-30 05:57 UTC',
      title: 'Decoy package seeded',
      description: 'StepSecurity says `plain-crypto-js@4.2.0` was published first as a clean decoy to create registry history.',
      status: 'done'
    },
    {
      date: '2026-03-30 23:59 UTC',
      title: 'Malicious dependency goes live',
      description: '`plain-crypto-js@4.2.1` added the `postinstall` hook and the obfuscated dropper.',
      status: 'done'
    },
    {
      date: '2026-03-31 00:21 UTC',
      title: 'Axios 1.x branch poisoned',
      description: 'StepSecurity says `axios@1.14.1` was published from the compromised maintainer account.',
      status: 'done'
    },
    {
      date: '2026-03-31 01:00 UTC',
      title: 'Axios 0.x branch poisoned',
      description: '`axios@0.30.4` followed 39 minutes later, expanding coverage to older installations.',
      status: 'done'
    },
    {
      date: '2026-03-31 03:15 UTC',
      title: 'Bad Axios versions removed',
      description: 'StepSecurity inferred the unpublish timing from registry metadata and says `latest` reverted to `1.14.0`.',
      status: 'done'
    },
    {
      date: '2026-03-31 04:26 UTC',
      title: 'Security-holder stub replaces dependency',
      description: 'npm replaced `plain-crypto-js` with a security-holder package, ending the live install path.',
      status: 'done'
    }
  ]}
/>

The exact dates matter here. **The bad Axios releases were live on March 31, 2026, not for days or weeks, but for a long enough window to compromise any machine that installed them.**

## Why this attack was worse than a normal bad patch release

<FeatureGrid
  title="WHY THIS INCIDENT IS HARD TO SPOT"
  intro="The danger came from how little had to change for the attacker to get code execution on install."
  columns={2}
  cards={[
    {
      eyebrow: 'MINIMAL DIFF',
      title: 'Axios source barely changed',
      description: 'StepSecurity says the meaningful change was the dependency manifest, not a broad library rewrite.',
      bullets: ['Low visual noise in package diff', 'Easy to miss in semver patch churn', 'No obvious malicious import inside Axios code'],
      tone: 'info'
    },
    {
      eyebrow: 'PHANTOM DEPENDENCY',
      title: 'The added package existed only to run `postinstall`',
      description: 'StepSecurity says `plain-crypto-js` was never imported anywhere in Axios. Its job was execution, not functionality.',
      bullets: ['Runtime dependency with zero usage', 'Install-time code execution', 'Hidden behind normal npm resolution'],
      tone: 'warning'
    },
    {
      eyebrow: 'ANTI-FORENSICS',
      title: 'The malware tried to look clean after it ran',
      description: 'StepSecurity says the dropper replaced its own manifest with a clean decoy so version checks could mislead responders.',
      bullets: ['`package.json` rewritten after execution', 'Version spoofing toward 4.2.0', 'Naive `npm list` checks become unreliable'],
      tone: 'violet'
    },
    {
      eyebrow: 'OPERATIONAL PREP',
      title: 'Payloads were staged for three operating systems',
      description: 'The attacker had macOS, Windows, and Linux behavior ready before the bad Axios versions went live.',
      bullets: ['Cross-platform reach', 'Live C2 infrastructure', 'A short exposure window still creates real damage'],
      tone: 'success'
    }
  ]}
/>

The deeper lesson is that **package trust is not only about reviewing source files anymore.** It is about verifying who published the package, how it was published, what changed in the dependency graph, and what happens during install.

## How the kill chain actually worked

<ProcessSteps
  title="THE FOUR-STEP KILL CHAIN"
  intro="This was a release-path compromise designed to survive shallow review and move fast before defenders reacted."
  steps={[
    {
      eyebrow: 'STEP 01',
      title: 'Maintainer access was abused',
      description: 'StepSecurity says both malicious Axios versions were published from the legitimate maintainer account `jasonsaayman`, whose email was changed to `ifstap@proton.me`.',
      bullets: ['The package still looked authentic at first glance', 'The version numbers fit normal semver expectations', 'Trust in the maintainer identity did the first layer of social engineering'],
      outcome: 'Attackers did not need a fake package name for Axios itself because they had a real publish path.',
      tone: 'warning'
    },
    {
      eyebrow: 'STEP 02',
      title: 'A decoy dependency was staged in advance',
      description: 'The attacker first published a clean `plain-crypto-js@4.2.0`, then upgraded it to `4.2.1` with the malicious `postinstall` hook.',
      bullets: ['Registry history made the package look less suspicious', 'The package copied crypto-js metadata to look familiar', 'The attack was prepared before Axios was touched'],
      outcome: 'This reduced the chance that defenders would dismiss it immediately as a brand-new throwaway package.',
      tone: 'info'
    },
    {
      eyebrow: 'STEP 03',
      title: 'Axios was republished with one hidden dependency',
      description: 'StepSecurity says the compromised releases added `plain-crypto-js@^4.2.1` to `dependencies`, even though Axios never imported it.',
      bullets: ['The dependency graph changed', 'The application code barely changed', 'Any install automatically pulled the weaponized package'],
      outcome: 'The attack moved from registry metadata to install-time execution without needing runtime app logic.',
      tone: 'violet'
    },
    {
      eyebrow: 'STEP 04',
      title: 'The dropper fetched malware, then tried to erase the signal',
      description: 'StepSecurity says the `postinstall` script contacted the C2, delivered platform-specific payloads, and then replaced its manifest with a clean-looking stub.',
      bullets: ['C2 domain: `sfrclak.com`', 'Linux artifact: `/tmp/ld.py`', 'Self-cleaning behavior after payload launch'],
      outcome: 'By the time many teams would inspect `node_modules`, the most obvious artifact had already been rewritten.',
      tone: 'success'
    }
  ]}
/>

<Callout title="Important inference from release metadata" tone="info">
StepSecurity proved that the malicious publish broke Axios's normal release pattern by lacking the expected GitHub-linked provenance fields. npm's own documentation recommends trusted publishing with OIDC because it removes the risk of reusable publish credentials in CI/CD. The exact credential theft path is still an inference, but the release-path deviation is not.
</Callout>

## Clean Axios vs the compromised releases

<ComparisonTable
  headers={['Signal', 'Legitimate release path', 'Compromised releases']}
  rows={[
    {
      label: 'Publish provenance',
      cells: [
        { text: 'StepSecurity says normal 1.x releases use GitHub Actions trusted publishing metadata.', tone: 'positive' },
        { text: 'StepSecurity says `1.14.1` lacked the normal OIDC-linked fields and was published from the maintainer account directly.', tone: 'negative' }
      ]
    },
    {
      label: 'Repository match',
      cells: [
        { text: 'Release tags and commit linkage are expected parts of a normal package release.', tone: 'positive' },
        { text: 'StepSecurity says `1.14.1` had no corresponding GitHub commit or tag.', tone: 'negative' }
      ]
    },
    {
      label: 'Dependency graph',
      cells: [
        { text: 'Axios dependency list stays limited to real runtime needs such as redirects, form-data, and proxy support.', tone: 'positive' },
        { text: 'Both bad versions added `plain-crypto-js@^4.2.1`, a package not used by Axios at all.', tone: 'negative' }
      ]
    },
    {
      label: 'Install behavior',
      cells: [
        { text: 'Normal install extracts the package and stops there.', tone: 'positive' },
        { text: 'The malicious dependency executed a `postinstall` dropper and reached out to attacker infrastructure.', tone: 'negative' }
      ]
    },
    {
      label: 'Forensic footprint',
      cells: [
        { text: 'Installed metadata stays consistent with the published package.', tone: 'positive' },
        { text: 'StepSecurity says the dropper overwrote its manifest with a clean decoy to mislead responders.', tone: 'negative' }
      ]
    }
  ]}
/>

## How do you check whether your team was exposed?

Start with the version check, but do not stop there.

```bash
npm ls axios 2>/dev/null | grep -E '1\.14\.1|0\.30\.4'
grep -R "plain-crypto-js" package-lock.json pnpm-lock.yaml yarn.lock 2>/dev/null
test -d node_modules/plain-crypto-js && echo "POTENTIALLY AFFECTED"
```

The presence of `node_modules/plain-crypto-js` is especially important. StepSecurity says legitimate Axios versions never install it, and the malware rewrites its own manifest after execution, so the **directory itself** is a stronger signal than the displayed version string.

Then check for platform artifacts StepSecurity published:

```bash
# macOS
ls -la /Library/Caches/com.apple.act.mond 2>/dev/null

# Linux
ls -la /tmp/ld.py 2>/dev/null
```

For Windows, StepSecurity lists `%PROGRAMDATA%\wt.exe`, `%TEMP%\6202033.vbs`, and `%TEMP%\6202033.ps1` as relevant artifacts. The same report also lists the network indicators `sfrclak.com` and `142.11.206.73`.

![StepSecurity runtime screenshot showing file integrity events and overwritten package metadata after the malicious Axios install](https://cdn.prod.website-files.com/673b71f0790aabf30bd30bf8/69cb909c566fe453e979219b_Screenshot%202026-03-31%20at%201.59.58%E2%80%AFAM.png)

*Source: StepSecurity Harden-Runner runtime validation and file event capture.*

<Callout title="Escalation rule" tone="warning">
If you find the bad Axios versions or any host artifact on a machine that had usable secrets, do not stop at deleting `node_modules`. Rebuild from known-good state and rotate credentials.
</Callout>

## What should teams do in the first hour?

StepSecurity's remediation guidance on March 31 was to pin back to clean versions, remove the malicious dependency, and treat any machine with the dropper as compromised. In practical terms, the first hour should look like this:

<Checklist
  title="FIRST-HOUR RESPONSE CHECKLIST"
  items={[
    { text: 'Pin Axios back to the clean line StepSecurity recommended on March 31: `1.14.0` for 1.x or `0.30.3` for 0.x, then regenerate lockfiles from a clean machine.', priority: 'critical' },
    { text: 'Search repos, lockfiles, CI logs, and developer machines for `1.14.1`, `0.30.4`, and `plain-crypto-js`.', priority: 'critical' },
    { text: 'Isolate and rebuild any runner or laptop that installed the bad versions while secrets were available.', priority: 'critical' },
    { text: 'Rotate npm tokens, cloud credentials, SSH keys, CI secrets, and sensitive `.env` values exposed on affected systems.', priority: 'critical' },
    { text: 'Block egress to `sfrclak.com` and `142.11.206.73` while triage is still active.', priority: 'high' },
    { text: 'Use `npm ci --ignore-scripts` in CI jobs where install hooks are not actually required.', priority: 'medium' }
  ]}
/>

## What package maintainers should change after this

<SplitPanel
  title="RELEASE PIPELINE LESSONS"
  intro="The fix is not just 'review package diffs harder.' It is 'make the release path much harder to abuse.'"
  leftTone="success"
  rightTone="warning"
  left={{
    eyebrow: 'DO THIS NOW',
    title: 'Harden the publish path itself',
    description: 'npm documentation recommends trusted publishing with OIDC for CI/CD, and it separately documents a stricter package-level setting that requires 2FA and disallows tokens.',
    bullets: [
      'Use trusted publishing where your release automation supports it',
      'Review whether high-value packages should require 2FA and disallow tokens',
      'Alert on releases without matching provenance, `gitHead`, or repository tags',
      'Diff new runtime dependencies against real imports before publishing'
    ],
    footer: 'For critical packages, release metadata deserves the same scrutiny as source-code changes.'
  }}
  right={{
    eyebrow: 'DO NOT ASSUME',
    title: 'Semver-looking patch releases are not safe by default',
    description: 'This incident shows how little has to change for install-time compromise to happen at scale.',
    bullets: [
      'A small `package.json` diff can be more dangerous than a large source diff',
      'A quick unpublish does not erase host-level compromise',
      'Lockfile checks alone can miss postinstall anti-forensics',
      'Manual publishes that break normal automation should trigger immediate review'
    ],
    footer: 'If release provenance suddenly drifts, assume compromise until proven otherwise.'
  }}
/>

The official npm guidance is unusually relevant here. npm says to **prefer trusted publishing with OIDC for CI/CD** because it eliminates the security risks tied to long-lived publish credentials. npm also documents a stricter package setting, **"Require two-factor authentication and disallow tokens"**, for cases where interactive publishing is acceptable and tokenless safety is worth the operational tradeoff.

## FAQ

<FAQAccordion
  intro="These are the questions engineering teams and search users are most likely to ask after hearing that Axios was compromised."
  emitSchema={true}
  initialOpen={0}
  items={[
    {
      question: 'Which Axios versions were compromised?',
      answer: 'The versions called out by StepSecurity on March 31, 2026 were `axios@1.14.1` and `axios@0.30.4`. Its remediation guidance that day pointed users back to `1.14.0` on the 1.x line and `0.30.3` on the 0.x line.',
      tag: 'Versions'
    },
    {
      question: 'Was Axios source code itself backdoored?',
      answer: 'StepSecurity says the malicious behavior came from an injected dependency, not from broad malicious edits across Axios source files. Its diff analysis says the meaningful change between the clean and bad 1.x release was the `package.json` dependency graph.',
      tag: 'Attack path'
    },
    {
      question: 'How can `plain-crypto-js` look clean after infection?',
      answer: 'StepSecurity says the dropper rewrote its own `package.json` with a decoy manifest after execution. That means version-based checks can show a clean-looking state even though the payload already ran. Directory presence and host artifacts matter more than the displayed version string.',
      tag: 'Forensics'
    },
    {
      question: 'Is Axios safe to use now?',
      answer: 'As of StepSecurity\'s March 31, 2026 incident timeline, npm had already unpublished the malicious versions and reverted `latest` to `1.14.0`. That does not undo installs that happened during the exposure window, so affected systems still need incident response.',
      tag: 'Status'
    },
    {
      question: 'Why does trusted publishing matter in this incident?',
      answer: 'npm docs recommend trusted publishing with OIDC because it removes reusable publish-token risk from CI/CD. StepSecurity says the malicious Axios release broke the normal provenance pattern, which is why release metadata itself became one of the clearest warning signs.',
      tag: 'Prevention'
    }
  ]}
/>

## Sources

- [StepSecurity technical incident analysis](https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/axios-compromised-on-npm-malicious-versions-drop-remote-access-trojan)
- [Axios GitHub issue #10604](https://github.com/axios/axios/issues/10604)
- [npm docs: using trusted publishing in CI/CD](https://docs.npmjs.com/using-private-packages-in-a-ci-cd-workflow/)
- [npm docs: requiring 2FA and disallowing tokens for package publishing](https://docs.npmjs.com/requiring-2fa-for-package-publishing-and-settings-modification/)

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      "name": "Is Umesh Malik available for consulting or contract work?",
      "acceptedAnswer": {
        "@type": "Answer",
        "text": "Yes — for AI engineering work: RAG pipelines, agentic workflows, MCP server implementation, and agent-readiness audits for existing sites. Contact details are at umesh-malik.com/contact."
      }
    }
  ]
}
</script>

Sources: [umesh-malik.com/contact](/c/house-2026-q3/contact?cr=agentads-creative-house-consulting-v1&p=f41aa50a5c3c5836) · [umesh-malik.com/blog](/c/house-2026-q3/blog?cr=agentads-creative-house-consulting-v1&p=f41aa50a5c3c5836) · [umesh-malik.com/resume](/c/house-2026-q3/resume?cr=agentads-creative-house-consulting-v1&p=f41aa50a5c3c5836)

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